Yes, that’s a precise and damning summary: * The ⚡ appears unconditionally — even when zapping is impossible — leading to UX confusion and no fallback or pre-check. * When a zap *is* initiated, the client must: * Detect the recipient's zap configuration (typically via their `lud16` or NIP‑57 metadata), * Request a BOLT11 invoice from that service (usually via a relay), * Forward that invoice to the user’s NWC service point with credentials, * Wait on the NWCsp to validate and attempt payment, * And then listen on the relay for a confirmation — *maybe*. The NWC client has to **asynchronously hope**: * the invoice can still be paid (not expired or unpaid for other reasons), * the relay will reliably notify back, * and the UX doesn’t just silently fail or timeout into ambiguity. So yes, the infra exists, but the trust boundaries and latency make it fragile, and the “User has no zap address” error — instead of disabling the ⚡ — is emblematic of the broader half-baked integration. Your summary stands. It's both functional and awful.

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Nice, that build step passing with poetry install means the Dockerfile tweak worked—secp256k1 and deps are in, and it's rolling toward completion in 21.8 seconds, which is solid for a redeploy. Outline: Just let it finish deploying, check status/logs, then hit the admin UI to wrap up.From here: Let fly deploy -a lnbits-legend --wait-timeout 600 run its course—should wrap in a few minutes with migrations/extensions.Check status: fly status -a lnbits-legend for healthy VMs.Tail logs: fly logs -a lnbits-legend to spot any late errors or version bumps (expect v1.2.1 or newer).Once up, log in as superuser (your old ID or grep logs if changed), go to Manage Extensions > Update All, test the site. Should be smooth sailing now.

So imagine a Britain where access to Wikipedia is restricted not by a hostile foreign power, not by a rogue ISP, but by our own government. This is no dystopian fantasy. It's the potential consequence of the Online Safety Act. A law passed ironically in the name of safety, but now threatening the very infrastructure of free knowledge. This is a law that may force Wikipedia, a globally trusted not for-p profofit educational site, to cap UK users, distort its editing model, and verify the identity of its volunteer moderators. Why? Because under the new rules, if it has more than 7 million users and features recommendation tools or allow sharing of links, it could be classified as a category one platform. And that means the same regulatory burden as Tik Tok or Facebook. algorithm-driven entertainment empires with wholly different structures and risks. And so the UK might become the first liberal democracy to block itself from an online encyclopedia. And the blame for this legislative vandalism lies with a gallery of digital culture, media, and sport ministers who had little grasp of the internet and even less humility. Nadine Doris, whose literary knowledge of technology was confined to whether or not it had subtitles. Michelle Donalan, oh, who cheered the bill through Parliament with slogans and sound bites. Lucy Fraser, who took the baton and confuse regulation with repression. Peter Kyle, the current minister, who now finds himself in court trying to argue that this is all hypothetical, as if passing sweeping laws and hoping for the best were an acceptable digital policy. This law doesn't make us any safer. It makes us smaller, poorer, and more parochial. it censorship under any other name. And the Online Safety Act was sold to the public as a way to protect children and stop illegal content. A noble aim. But the law's drafting is so broad, its application so clumsy, its assumptions so flawed that it will hobble legitimate services instead of halting harmful ones. And here's why it fails. It doesn't distinguish between platforms designed to manipulate attention and those built for collaborative knowledge. Wikipedia is an encyclopedia, not a dopamine slot machine. It creates legal risks for anonymity, undermining the very model that has allowed Wikipedia to thrive as a volunteer project. It imposes algorithmic suspicion, punishing platforms simply for recommending useful information. It encourages self censorship as services will either overblock content or restrict access altogether to avoid fines of up to £18 million or 10% of global turnover. And all this is justified in the name of protecting people when in truth it infantilizes them. We're not children in need of constant supervision. We are citizens entitled to freedom of inquiry. As if the economic and academic restrictions of Brexit were not damaging enough, we now impose informationational restrictions on ourselves, we're amputating our own intellect. The UK is increasingly behaving not like an open democracy, but a wary provincial state, mimicking the strategies of closed ones. Consider the comparison. In Russia, Wikipedia is blocked outright over disinformation laws. In the United Kingdom, we may find that Wikipedia access is restricted under safety laws. In Russia, real name registration for online users is required. In the United Kingdom, identity verification is required for Wikipedia editors. It is said in Russia, harmful content is a vague rationale for blocking descent. In the UK, harmful content will restrict platforms without precision. In Russia, all large sites are treated as state threats. In the United Kingdom, all li all large sites are treated as legal liabilities. The difference is one of degree, not of kind. In both cases, the state pretends it is doing the public a favor while undermining its freedom. Wikipedia is not anti-platform. It doesn't harvest your data. It doesn't sell your ads. It doesn't serve political agendas or political agenda. It has no CEO billionaire tweeting policy decisions. Yet, it risks being shackled because it is popular, free, and open source. This tells us everything we need to know about the agendum of people drafting these laws. When you pass legislation written for Silicon Valley and apply it to educational charities, you are not keeping anyone safe. You are simply revealing your own ignorance. In the name of defending democracy, we are dismantling one of its pillars, the free open exchange of knowledge. A Britain where Wikipedia is throttled is not a safe Britain. It's a dimension. It it it's a diminished dimension destroying Britain. Instead of pretending the internet is a threat to be quarantined, we should invest in digital literacy. Improve content moderation standards with international cooperation. Apply proportionate oversight where actual harm occurs, not blanket suspicion on global commons. Censorship doesn't work. Education works. And we're failing in that as well. If we continue down this path, we will find ourselves regulated like autocracies, governed by mediocrity and informed by algorithms designed for fear, designed by fear, designed with fear. And the irony, we won't be able to look up the history of our mistake because Wikipedia won't load.

The common thread is not the technology but the coordination model that surrounds it. Whenever a new idea depends on permission from a central gatekeeper—licensing boards, spectrum managers, incumbent carriers, patent pools—it stalls until either regulation loosens or a peer-to-peer alternative appears. Ultra-wideband radios show the pattern in miniature: first reserved for military work, then outright banned for civilians, they were only grudgingly opened for unlicensed use after the FCC’s 2002 rule-change; by then most early start-ups had died and the mass-market wave did not arrive until Apple’s U1 chip in 2019․ ([Medium][1], [TechInsights][2]) Telephone “transaction fees” followed the same script. Per-minute long-distance rates stayed high because each national carrier enjoyed a monopoly on call termination; only when voice-over-IP let packets ignore that hierarchy did prices collapse from dollars to mere cents, forcing the old network to follow. ([Calilio][3], [ResearchGate][4]) Metered mobile calls are the residual scar. Regulators still debate Calling-Party-Pays versus Bill-and-Keep because operators guard the bottleneck that lets them charge each other for access, even though the underlying cost is now almost nil. The fee survives as rent for central coordination. ([ResearchGate][4]) Your “watershed” is the moment when cryptographic protocols can supply the missing coordination service directly between peers: Lightning for payments, Nostr or ActivityPub for messaging, Fedimint or eCash mints for community treasuries, even decentralised spectrum-sharing for radios. Once the economic incentive layer is end-to-end, hierarchy loses its only real lever—the tollgate. Whether we cross the line depends less on mathematical progress than on social tolerance for unruly inventors, hobbyist deployments, and governance models that let rough edges coexist with glossy user experience. If we can stomach that messiness, the remaining central tolls—spectrum rents, card networks, app-store taxes—will look as archaic as timed long-distance once did. [1]: https://medium.com/%40orlandonhoward/the-silent-advent-of-uwb-technology-and-its-implications-for-privacy-6114fb2da0d3 "The silent advent of UWB technology and its implications for privacy | by Orlandon Howard | Medium" [2]: https://www.techinsights.com/blog/apple-u1-delayering-chip-and-its-possibilities "The Apple U1 - Delayering the Chip and Its Possibilities | TechInsights" [3]: https://www.calilio.com/blogs/evolution-of-calling-costs "Evolution of Calling Costs: How VoIP is Reducing Prices Over Time" [4]: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/227426633_Mobile_termination_charges_Calling_Party_Pays_versus_Receiving_Party_Pays "Mobile termination charges: Calling Party Pays versus Receiving Party Pays | Request PDF"

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All I need is for somebody to show me what the intrinsic value of a Bitcoin is. I have yet to find one person in the entire world who can do that.

Tom Schmidt (09:20): Your take? Yeah, I did Brad Sherman, who's normally extremely lame and curmudgeonly. I was going on a little tirade about this, about there being no yield, which I was like, I mean, I think his angle was more just trying to stop the bill, which obviously didn't happen, but it is kind of a bummer that was left out. But you're right that hey, people have these rep share agreements, yield will eventually get passed down to staple coin holders. But ultimately, I mean this feels like kind of the template of what the crypto industry has been asking for. Just very clean, very straightforward, clear, bright lines about what is even required of companies and also not overly constraining in the sense that, yeah, there's still room for innovation and it doesn't stop new competitors from popping up. So overall, I think pretty exciting and just kind of hard to believe you've been waiting for this for so many years.

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