Listen, if youâre leaving ColdCard due to this issue and switching to Bitkey, just know that you havenât changed your risk posture towards this class of issue. Youâre still trusting someone else with your seed generation. #Bitcoin
The sufficiency comes from the number of dice rolls. If you roll one die, you get 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6. (6 options) If you roll two dice, you get 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, or 66. (6 x 6 = 36 options) If you roll three dice, you get 111, 112, 113, 114, âŚ, 663, 664, 665 or 666. (6 x 6 x 6 = 216 options) And so on. Each dice you roll multiplies the total number of options by 6. So if you roll 100 dice, the number of options is 6^100 = 6.533Ă10âˇâˇ This is an unimaginably vast number. Vetting that the rolls produce the seed is secondary. The important point is that each roll multiplies the search space, and 100 is plenty.
In Bitcoin, ownership is what you KNOW. You either know the keys and can move coins, or you donât. So, how do you KNOW that nobody that you has your seed? The only way is to generate it yourself. If you trust ANYONE ELSE to generate your seed material, then you DONâT KNOW that no one else has it. Therefore, you MUST generate your OWN ENTROPY in order to KNOW that itâs safe. #Bitcoin
For people freaking out, here are a two relatively quick mitigations that donât require any new hardware: 1. Using your existing ColdCard and seed, you can set up a passphrase. This acts like an entirely separate wallet on the same device. You can then sweep the coins to the passphrase sub-wallet. 2. Using your existing ColdCard and seed, set up a 2-of-2 wallet using that device and a software seed using Sparrow or Blue Wallet. Your attacker would have to both exploit the ColdCard vulnerability AND hack your software wallet to move those coins. Stay frosty out there. #Bitcoin
E N T R O P Y
The point of the airgap is to reduce the likelihood your seed leaks during signing. The alternative is to plug the device into the machine (USB) or have it communicate over some other channel (BlueTooth, camera + QR codes). Airgapped with PSBT or QR is the least leaky available option. But again, the point is to protect the seed during signing. Not to generate seeds. Not to protect data at rest.
Think of it this way: a single dice roll produces a number from 1-6. The information content of this is log2(6) = 2.585. That is, each roll produces about two and a half bits worth of entropy. A 12-word seed phrase encodes 128 bits of entropy. 128 / 2.585 = 49.516. So, yes, to generate a 12-word seed phrase, you need to combine the entropy from 50+ independent dice rolls. The same logic holds for a 24-word seed phrase which encodes 256 bits of entropy. For that you need the combined entropy of 100+ dice rolls. BUT the key factor here that most people miss is HOW those rolls are combined. Somehow, your sequence of dice rolls (5-4-5-2-1-âŚ-6-6-4) has to be converted into words (bacon-celery-zoo-âŚ). If that mechanism is the hardware wallet, then youâre STILL TRUSTING the device, albeit a different code path. How do you know that those rolls produce THAT seed? So yes, dice rolls are a big step up from just trusting the deviceâs random number generator. But youâre still vulnerable to other not-yet-discovered bugs in the hardware. To immunize yourself from ANY hardware bugs, you have to roll your own seed material OFFLINE.
If you roll the dice and put them in the machine to produce your seed, youâre STILL TRUSTING THE DEVICE. How do you know that those dice rolls yield THAT seed? Youâre out here thinking youâre paranoid using dice with a hardware wallet. Iâm telling you, you are NOT PARANOID ENOUGH. #Bitcoin
Heâs saying that knowing where the coin went wonât get it back.
Multi-vendor multisig is even better. Any given provider may have a bug. Multiple independent vendors means youâre protected from any particular one.
Possession may be 9/10 of the law. But itâs 10/10 of the #Bitcoin
When you generate your seeds, donât just let the device produce it. You have to add your own entropy in some form. Many people use dice rolls. I use playing cards. Multi-vendor multisig is ideal. That way, if any particular vendor has a vulnerability (as in this case) your attacker still canât move your coin.
Great question. At some point, in order to use Bitcoin, youâre going to need a computer. Hardware wallets compute all the time. For example, they compute addresses from XPUBs. They compute XPUBs from seeds and so on. A BIP-39 checksum word contains bits from the SHA256 of the actual entropy payload. Calculating this SHA256 sum by hand is intractable. So, in my opinion, the hardware wallet SHOULD be wiling to generate a checksum word for you based on the incoming entropy. ColdCard will do this. I believe SeedSigner will as well. Last I checked, Sparrow WILL NOT do this for you. There are various other tools that may have this capability. But yeah, at the end of the day, you need multiple independent vendors to perform these kinds of calculations: - Generating the last word of a BIP39 seed phrase - Generating an XPUB from a seed phrase - Generating a master key fingerprint (XFP) from a seed phrase - Generating addresses from an XPUB Hardware wallets are powerful enough to do these things. Whether and how many is up to the vendor to implement.
Well, I meant hypothetically đ
You can get out in front of these by messaging your friends and family first.
Plenty of months left in the year đ¤
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