That’s a good question, but this isn’t actually a new risk unique to Nostr. Any software distribution channel depends on some account or key. If an attacker gained access to GitHub maintainers’ accounts, or to DNS records, the outcome could be the same. Nostr doesn’t make this problem worse... it just changes the medium. More importantly, Wasabi doesn’t auto-update. The client only notifies users that an update is available. Before any update is accepted, the client independently checks that the binaries are signed with our official PGP key, which is bundled into the software. If the signatures don’t match, the update is rejected. On top of that, operating systems themselves add another layer of defense. Windows and macOS both enforce developer certificate checks at runtime, so an attacker would also need to compromise our Apple and Microsoft signing certificates to avoid OS-level warnings. Compared to our previous GitHub-based distribution, this is actually a step up in security. Back then, compromising a single maintainer account could have been enough to trick clients into surfacing a malicious update. Now, even if someone compromised our Nostr key, they would still face multiple cryptographic and OS-level hurdles before a malicious build could ever be accepted by users’ machines.
