All good points. As someone else wrote, the biggest risk is a mathematical breakthrough. Since these are inherently unpredictable there is no way to hedge against something that might happen tomorrow or might happen never, other than to just give up. On the other hand, it is the engineering difficulties in the practical implementations of these designs much more so than quantum error correction scaling that provides more fundamental limits on system size. Issues such as thermal cooling, control circuitry and cabling, manufacturing yield, environmental shielding, and supply chains for components all present massive challenges to creating a hundreds of thousands of qubits system needed to produce error corrected logical qubits of the size necessary to put ECC at risk. Surmounting these requires solving not just physics or math issues, but coordinating and tooling an industrial, financial, and political capacity I am deeply skeptical is actually achievable. I maintain that the primary motivation to look at post-quantum cryptography now is to mitigate the "harvest and decrypt later" situation perhaps more important in communication systems like Nostr than in Bitcoin.