If we’re doing security checkups in Bitcoin self-custody, we need to cover everything: cold and hot wallets, multi-signature setups, all of it. We can’t audit one storage type and leave the rest for later. AI-driven attacks won’t wait for us to finish patching one vulnerability before moving to the next. Many people are offline, not following X or Nostr discussions. Please check your contact lists and make the effort to reach everyone in the bitcoin space. Also, telling people to use such platforms as GoFundMe after a bitcoin hack is dangerous advice. GoFundMe will freeze accounts after a few donations once they see funds are being raised in connection with bitcoin / hack attacks. You are sending people into a wall. @ODFoundation take our responsibility to inform our network of activists, where bitcoin is the only financial tool they have. But we also live in a different reality from most of the bitcoin community. A hot wallet with a small amount is our everything. We need a coordinated response - develop clear instructions on what we can actually advise, reflecting this new reality where AI systems are testing us endlessly.

With the Digital ID framework, the Digital Euro, and Chat Control all moving toward implementation, the question 'what happens when the state turns off your money?' is no longer theoretical for any EU resident or entity. Are you ready to fight back for your rights? Let's meet at in September!

Addressing the weaponization of INTERPOL: 3/3 This is where your voice can make a difference in protecting people from INTERPOL abuse. As constituents, lawyers, civil society, privacy specialists and people who have been victims of INTERPOL’s abuse, we should jointly push for the reform. France holds the Presidency of INTERPOL's Executive Committee. The US, Germany and Canada also sit on it — four of the thirteen members of the body that supervises the General Secretariat. These are the states with a direct hand in INTERPOL's governance. They are the ones who can turn the resolution's recommendations into protection and accountability. Safeguards that depend on the good faith of the requesting state are not safeguards. Notification and published statistics work regardless of who issues the notice. In the next posts we will go through the remedies and accountability measures the OSCE PA proposes. If you want to support this advocacy — now is the moment. Join us!

Yes, but it is only about time as I understand…

2/3 Why you should work with parliamentarians from the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly as a constituent? Because the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly is one of the few tables where the EU, the US, Canada and Central Asia sit together — and transnational financial repression does not respect any single jurisdiction. As result, our personal data, access to financial services, our security under real threat. What one parliament alone cannot fix, European, American and Canadian parliamentarians can address together. That is where the resolution comes from on countering transnational financial repression and the weaponisation of INTERPOL, FATF AML/CFT laws and cybersecurity regulations, initiated by Italian parliamentarian Mauro Del Barba. It maps the impact on the rights of citizens and entities in Western societies, and sets out remedies and accountability for the abuse of these tools. We have been working on this with Mauro for a long time. It started in 2013, with our first recommendation that INTERPOL provide clear remedies for refugees. This time it reaches Russia and other adversary states abusing inter-state mechanisms to collect the data and attack the rights of citizens, entities and officials of Western countries — including officials of the EU and NATO. I’m very grateful to Euractiv for covering this, especially the INTERPOL dimension. Euractiv reports the OSCE is "alarmed" that INTERPOL's Purple Notices and its newer Silver Notices can be used without giving targeted individuals a clear way to appeal or request review. INTERPOL tightened scrutiny of Russian requests after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. But concerns remain around the Silver Notice — an international alert that lets member countries track, identify and recover assets. A German law official told Euractiv the mechanism gives Russia "an excellent tool" to make discreet inquiries into the assets of the people it targets: bank accounts, real estate, companies held abroad. Several of these reforms mirror provisions already moving through the US Congress. Legislators on both sides of the Atlantic can now reference a common standard. Link: https://www.euractiv.com/news/exclusive-osce-warns-against-russias-weaponisation-of-interpol/

Yes, that is why I remind about it …

TRANSNATIONAL FINANCIAL REPRESSION: WHAT THE OSCE PA IS ASKING FOR 1/3 Close to vacation time, the European Commission is pushing on Chat Control and age verification — measures that erode the privacy of communication and of access to the internet, and put citizens and entities in the EU at serious risk. At the same time, parliamentarians across the transatlantic space are calling for something the EU has not done: a proper assessment of how third countries weaponise INTERPOL, AML/CFT and cybersecurity tools against citizens and entities in the West. These two things cannot be separated. Every mechanism built to see more of what people do gets abused, eventually, by states or their proxies that mean them harm. For the first time in the transatlantic space, an OSCE PA resolution defines who the victims of transnational financial repression actually are. Not only civil society and diaspora — but entrepreneurs, donors, judges, MPs, scientists, and officials of the EU and NATO. The resolution says an attack on any of these categories has to be treated as an attack on the democratic, economic and security architecture of the OSCE area as a whole. It also calls for neutral regulatory language on privacy-preserving tools. AML/CFT and cybersecurity frameworks should describe end-to-end encryption, secure messaging, donation platforms ensuring donor privacy, digital payment tools and VPNs in terms respectful of fundamental rights — and must not treat the use of these tools as an intrinsic indicator of suspicious or criminal activity. Overbroad application of international cooperation mechanisms hits journalists, donors and human rights defenders who rely on them legitimately, for their own security. As a victim of transnational financial repression and president of the Open Dialogue Foundation I'm very grateful for OSCE PA and Mauro Del Barba for introducing this important reporm.